Did your pension manager vote for better climate disclosure from Canadian banks?
While three pension managers voted in favour of all three shareholder proposals examined in this analysis, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board stands out for its failure to support any.
Canada’s largest pension managers describe their “stewardship” and “engagement” processes as critical elements of their climate plans. However, Shift’s analysis of recent shareholder votes reveals that some pension funds are more willing than others to push publicly traded companies to take meaningful steps to manage climate-related risks and opportunities.
The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) stands out for its failure to support any of the climate-related shareholder proposals Shift tracked in the first half of 2025. In contrast, funds such as the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (BCI), the Investment Management Corporation of Ontario (IMCO) and Ontario’s University Pension Plan (UPP) are voting in favour of disclosure measures that would help investors assess how companies are handling climate-related risks and setting a trajectory to net-zero.
Background
This spring, Shift has been tracking how Canada’s largest pension managers voted on select climate-related shareholder resolutions at the annual general meetings of major Canadian banks.
Banks are a critical target for investor-led climate engagement. The financing that banks provide to projects and companies around the world can either lay the foundation for a zero-emissions economy, or it can lock in fossil fuel infrastructure and runaway climate impacts. By obtaining improved climate-related disclosure from banks, pension funds will be better able to determine the credibility of these financial institutions’ climate transition plans. This information would provide the basis for subsequent engagement.
Proposal 1: Calling on CIBC, TD and BMO to disclose their Energy Supply Ratios — their financing for low-carbon energy compared to their financing for fossil fuels. BloombergNEF has reported that, in global terms, the bank financing ratio must go from 0.89:1 in 2023 to 4:1 by the end of the decade in order to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. CIBC, TD and BMO do not currently disclose this financing ratio, leaving investor shareholders in the dark.
Proposal 2: Calling on CIBC to disclose the transition plans of its corporate and commercial clients, and its methodology for assessing their carbon risk. This would provide investors with more transparency on how CIBC’s lending aligns with its 2030 emissions reduction targets.
Proposal 3: Calling on BMO to provide greater disclosure of its lobbying activities, in keeping with its commitment to lobby in a manner consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement.
For more details on each proposal, see the end of this post.
Similar proposals have been withdrawn at other Canadian banks following dialogue that led to climate-related commitments:
Following engagement by the New York City Comptroller’s Office in 2024, RBC agreed to begin providing “information related to the methodology for the energy supply ratio” in its 2024 climate disclosures, to be published in 2025 (see RBC’s Management Proxy Circular p.116). RBC later backtracked on this commitment.
Following engagement by the Shareholder Association for Research & Education (SHARE) in 2025, Scotiabank has agreed to begin disclosing its energy supply ratio (Proposal 1) by June 1, 2026 (see SHARE blog).
How did your pension fund vote?
| Resolution: Disclosure of Energy Supply Ratio | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Pension Manager | Vote at CIBC (Apr 3) | Vote at TD (Apr 10) | Vote at BMO (Apr 11) |
| AIMCo | Against |
Against |
Against |
| BCI | For |
For |
For |
| CDPQ | For |
For |
For |
| CPPIB | Against |
Against |
Against |
| HOOPP | Declined to disclose vote | Declined to disclose vote | Declined to disclose vote |
| IMCO | For |
For |
For |
| OMERS | For |
For |
For |
| OPTrust | No vote -- does not own shares | No vote -- does not own shares | No vote -- does not own shares |
| OTPP | For |
No vote disclosed -- may not own shares | No vote disclosed -- may not own shares |
| PSP | No vote disclosed yet | No vote disclosed yet | No vote disclosed yet |
| UPP | For |
For |
For |
| Resolution: Industry-specific Carbon Risk Scoring/Transition Plans | |
|---|---|
| Pension Manager | Vote at CIBC (Apr 3) |
| AIMCo | Against |
| BCI | For |
| CDPQ | Against |
| CPPIB | Against |
| HOOPP | Declined to disclose vote |
| IMCO | For |
| OMERS | Against |
| OPTrust | No vote -- does not own shares |
| OTPP | Against |
| PSP | No vote disclosed yet |
| UPP | For |
| Resolution: Disclosure of Lobbying and Policy Influence Activities | |
|---|---|
| Pension Manager | Vote at BMO (Apr 11) |
| AIMCo | Against |
| BCI | For |
| CDPQ | For |
| CPPIB | Against |
| HOOPP | Declined to disclose vote |
| IMCO | For |
| OMERS | Against |
| OPTrust | No vote -- does not own shares |
| OTPP | No vote disclosed -- may not own shares |
| PSP | No vote disclosed yet |
| UPP | For |
The risky gaps in our national pension manager’s engagement strategy
CPPIB voted against all three shareholder resolutions examined in this analysis, and provided no specific rationale for any of these votes. CPPIB’s failure to support these proposals would have contradicted the spirit of its net-zero by 2050 commitment, except that our national pension manager quietly dropped this commitment — a cornerstone of a credible climate policy — in May 2025.
CPPIB’s votes seem to contradict its Proxy Voting Guidelines, revised on May 22, 2025, which state that it will “generally support” proposals “that improve practices and disclosure on governance, strategy, risk management, performance metrics, and targets and opportunities related to climate change, including both physical and transition related impacts” (p.7).
These recent proxy votes also continue a troubling trend at CPPIB. In 2024, the fund manager voted in favour of only five of 17 climate-related shareholder resolutions tracked by Investors for Paris Compliance. CPPIB also weakened its proxy voting guidelines in November 2024 — Shift’s analysis of CPPIB in our 2024 Report Card details how CPPIB softened a previous commitment to vote against corporate directors who fail to demonstrate adequate oversight of climate risk (p.15).
The Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo), an investment manager with deep fossil fuel ties on its board, no net-zero commitments, and no credible climate strategy, was the only other major Canadian pension manager to disclose that it voted against all three proposals. It provided the same blanket rationale for each vote: “AIMCo is currently satisfied with the company's approach and reporting on this issue and will continue to monitor it going forward.”
Sending clear signals on climate
Only three pension managers — BCI, IMCO and UPP — voted in favour of all three shareholder proposals examined in this analysis.
UPP and IMCO
UPP’s and IMCO’s strong climate-related voting records are consistent with these pension managers’ commitments to credible and accountable investor groups such as the Net Zero Asset Owner Alliance and the Paris Aligned Asset Owners. UPP’s voting record reflects its November 2023 Climate Stewardship Plan, which places a special emphasis on engaging with banks — identifying them as “allocators of capital that will shape climate transition”.
BCI
BCI has shown some leadership on climate engagement of public companies. Despite having so far failed to commit its own portfolio to net-zero, the investment manager has generally supported select climate-related proposals (as demonstrated, for example, in analyses of 2023 and 2024 proxy votes by Investors for Paris Compliance). The investment manager has also shown a willingness to take its engagement public: by filing climate-related shareholder proposals at Imperial Oil in 2023 and TC Energy in 2024, and by announcing ahead of Imperial Oil’s May 2023 annual general meeting that it planned to vote against multiple directors for not doing enough to incorporate climate-related targets into the company’s compensation plans. BCI’s voting record generally seems to support its intent “to support the global goal of net zero and align our portfolio to a low-carbon future”, as stated in its 2023-2024 Corporate Annual Report (p.10).
Voting Rationale
BCI, IMCO and UPP have all provided rationales for their votes that demonstrate their understanding that climate risk is investor risk. UPP stated that it supported Proposal 1 (energy supply ratio) “because it is requesting initiatives and/or targets aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement, including pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.”
In explaining its support for Proposal 2 (carbon risk / transition plans), BCI emphasized that “Additional disclosure helps investors better assess how climate risks can affect a company's activities and longer-term financial results.”
In explaining its support for Proposal 3 (disclosure of lobbying), IMCO stated that “additional disclosure of the company's direct and indirect lobbying-related expenditures would help shareholders better assess the risks and benefits associated with its involvement in the public policy process aimed at achieving its climate ambitions.”
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ)
CDPQ reaffirmed its determination to be a leader in the global energy transition in its 2024 Annual Report and 2024 Sustainable Investing Report. In this context, it was surprising to see Quebec’s public pension manager vote against Proposal 2 (carbon risk / transition plans). CDPQ voted in favour of the other two proposals.
Mixed messages on climate
The Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS) and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP)
OMERS and OTPP both voted in favour of Proposal 1 (energy supply ratio) and against Proposal 2 (carbon risk / transition plans). OMERS voted against Proposal 3 (disclosure of lobbying), while OTPP has not posted votes for a BMO annual meeting since 2019 — indicating the pension fund likely does not own shares in BMO.
OTPP stated that it voted against Proposal 2 (carbon risk / transition plans) because it believed it was “overly prescriptive at this time.” OMERS does not provide specific rationales for its votes, but its Proxy Voting Guidelines offer the broad rationale that it will not support climate-related proposals that “are overly prescriptive, duplicate existing practices or disclosure, or detract from shareholder value” (p.30).
OMERS’ and OTPP’s votes warrant further explanation. It is unclear why the funds would fail to support resolutions that are supported by several of their peers and that seem consistent with the pension managers’ net-zero commitments and memberships in climate engagement groups such as Climate Engagement Canada and Climate Action 100+. Managing the existential risk posed by climate change requires investors to, at times, take more prescriptive positions. This has been recognized by funds such as UPP, which disclosed that it deemed Proposal 2 (carbon risk / transition plans) to be “overly prescriptive” but supported it anyway, because of the greater importance of “requesting initiatives and/or targets aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement”.
OMERS’ vote against Proposal 3 (disclosure of lobbying) reveals a gap in the fund’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, which do not address lobbying activities. OMERS could draw language from OTPP, which states in its guidelines that it expects corporate political activities and participation in trade associations to align with corporate strategy (which would, in BMO’s case, include climate commitments) and expects “regular disclosure on political expenditures, rationales for political expenditure, dues to trade associations, and rationale for association dues paid.”
Other funds
Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP)
HOOPP does not provide basic disclosure of its individual proxy votes, and declined to disclose its votes on these select proposals when asked. HOOPP’s members and stakeholders are therefore left in the dark as to what extent the fund is stewarding its investments in line with its climate commitments. This lack of transparency appears inconsistent with HOOPP’s participation in Climate Engagement Canada, an initiative that seeks to increase accountability.
OPSEU Pension Trust (OPTrust)
OPTrust does not provide proactive disclosure of its proxy votes. When asked, staff informed Shift through email correspondence that OPTrust did not vote on any of the highlighted shareholder proposals because neither it nor any of its external managers are direct investors in CIBC, TD or BMO.
Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP)
In contrast with pension managers that provide timely disclosure of their proxy votes, PSP, the pension manager for the federal public service, had not yet posted its April 2025 proxy votes as of May 29, 2025. Shift will update this blog post once PSP discloses its votes.
Why this matters
Effective climate engagement includes making sure that public companies provide investors with enough information to make an informed decision about how companies are managing climate risks and opportunities, and whether they are aligning with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Proxy votes are one way in which pension managers can and should be using their influence to steer companies toward stronger climate policies and procedures.
Shareholder proposals covered in this analysis
Energy Supply Ratio
Proposals submitted by the Shareholder Association for Research & Education
Voted on at these annual general meetings: CIBC (April 3), TD (April 10) and BMO (April 11)
“that [BANK] disclose annually its Energy Supply Ratio defined as its total financing through equity and debt underwriting, and project finance, in low-carbon energy supply relative to that in fossil-fuel energy supply. The disclosure, prepared at reasonable expense and excluding confidential information, shall describe [BANK]s methodology, including what is classified as “low carbon” or “fossil fuel”. [BANK] should include lending in its Energy Supply Ratio, if methodologically sound.”
CIBC Management Proxy Circular p.103
TD Management Proxy Circular p.87
BMO Management Proxy Circular p.94
Industry-specific Carbon Risk Scoring / Transition Plans
Proposal submitted by Vancity Investment Management
Voted on at CIBC annual general meeting (April 3)
“Shareholders request that CIBC disclose, at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information, 1) industry specific scoring metrics for clients classified in the carbon risk scoring categories and 2) industry specific client transition plans with procedures to ensure these transition plans are aligned with CIBC’s 2030 interim targets to reduce financed emissions.”
CIBC Management Proxy Circular p.108
Disclosure of Lobbying and Policy Influence Activities
Proposal submitted by Investors for Paris Compliance
Voted on at BMO annual general meeting (April 11)
“Be it proposed that the Bank complete its disclosures of lobbying and policy influence activities, both direct and indirect – through trade associations, coalitions, alliances, and other organizations – to fulfill its commitment to lobby “in a manner consistent with [its] support for the aims and objectives of the Paris Agreement.”
BMO Management Proxy Circular p.95